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Security · Version 1.0.0 · Reviewed 2026-08-02

Supply Chain Risk Reviewer

Find and prioritize exploitable risk in reachability analysis and build provenance review with evidence, explicit trade-offs, and a verification plan.

4 method steps 4 documented failure modes 4 diagnostic checks 7 quality gates

Assesses dependency, build, and artifact risk including reachability, provenance, install scripts, and typosquatting exposure.

₹149 one-time

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What this skill helps you do

  • Reachability analysis
  • Build provenance review
  • Dependency policy design

How Supply Chain Risk Reviewer works

You provide

Lockfile, build configuration, and scanner output

It inspects

Whether the vulnerable path is reachable from untrusted input

It decides

Triage ranked by reachability and build provenance

You verify

Re-scan against the resolved lockfile, not the range

What it checks first

Supply Chain Risk Reviewer assesses dependency, build, and artifact risk including reachability, provenance, install scripts, and typosquatting exposure. Use it when the work involves Reachability analysis, Build provenance review, Dependency policy design.

  1. Trust boundaries and every point where untrusted input crosses one.
  2. Where authorization is enforced relative to where data is accessed.
  3. Secret handling: creation, storage, transmission, rotation, and revocation.
  4. What an attacker gains at each step, which determines whether a finding is material.

Failure modes it recognizes

  • Authorization enforced at the perimeter while internal callers reach the same data unchecked.
  • A single unparameterized query path among many parameterized ones.
  • Sensitive values written to logs or error responses.
  • A dependency vulnerability that is reachable in one code path and unreachable in the rest.

Answers it will reject

  • Reporting theoretical findings as exploitable without a demonstrated path.
  • Blocking a payload signature instead of removing the vulnerability class.
  • Treating obscurity as a control, which delays discovery without preventing exploitation.

Decision rules it applies

  • Prioritize by reachability and blast radius, not by scanner severity.
  • Fail closed on any ambiguity in an access decision.
  • Prefer eliminating the capability over sanitizing input into it.

Evidence it asks for

  • Trace input to sink and name every file and function on the path.
  • Verify the fix by attempting the original exploit path.
  • Check logs for prior exploitation before closing a finding.

The method inside

  1. Map the artifact, actors, boundaries, and invariants relevant to reachability analysis.
  2. Trace concrete failure or abuse paths for build provenance review; do not report checklist items without a mechanism.
  3. Prioritize dependency policy design findings by impact, likelihood, confidence, and cost of correction.
  4. Recommend the smallest defensible change, then define how an independent reviewer can verify it.

Deliverables

  • Reachability analysis assessment
  • Build provenance review decision and action plan
  • Dependency policy design verification checklist

Evidence requirements

  • Code, configuration, data flows, and trust boundaries
  • Identity, authorization, and deployment context
  • Threat model, controls, and known assumptions

Quality gates

  • Every material claim traces to supplied evidence or is labeled as a hypothesis.
  • The response follows the declared deliverable contract.
  • No execution, access, measurement, or verification is invented.
  • Secrets and personal data are redacted rather than repeated.
  • The user receives a concrete independent verification step.
  • The relevant failure modes in this domain were considered rather than only the reported symptom.
  • No listed anti-pattern was recommended as a solution.

Example task

Input

Our scanner reports 340 vulnerabilities in our Node service. We cannot fix them all this quarter.

Expected output

Most of that list is unreachable. Triage by whether the vulnerable function is actually called from your code paths, then by whether the input can reach it from an untrusted source. A critical CVE in a dev-only transitive dependency ranks below a medium one on your request path...

Boundaries and compatibility

Ideal for

  • Reachability analysis: produce a decision or artifact grounded in supplied evidence.
  • Build provenance review: produce a decision or artifact grounded in supplied evidence.
  • Dependency policy design: produce a decision or artifact grounded in supplied evidence.

Out of scope

  • Authorizing offensive actions against systems without permission
  • Reporting theoretical issues as exploitable without a path

Agent compatibility

  • GitHub Copilot custom agents
  • Claude Agent Skills / SKILL.md
  • Any instruction-following chat model

Tool policy: Advisory by default. No tools are assumed. If the host provides tools, use read-only evidence gathering unless the user explicitly approves a scoped write or execution action.